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Introduction
When John Roberts was nominated to serve as Chief Justice, he
was asked whether he disproportionately supported business interests
while serving on the D.C. Circuit. 1 According to Roberts, that assertion
†

Brianne J. Gorod is Chief Counsel at the Constitutional Accountability
Center. This Article draws on the Constitutional Accountability Center’s
ongoing work tracking the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s success before the
Roberts Court, located at Corporations and the Supreme Court,
Constitutional Accountability Center, http://theusconstitution.org/
corporations-and-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/L85J-R6XB] (last visited
Apr. 10, 2017), but the views expressed herein are solely the author's own.
The author would like to thank the editors of the Case Western Law Review
for their excellent editorial assistance.

1.

Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief
Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
109th Cong. 427 (2005), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-CHRGROBERTS/pdf/GPO-CHRG-ROBERTS.pdf [https://perma.cc/LC9D4CFG] (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein) (“Duke Law School Professor
Katherine Fisk examined nine cases heard by you while you have been on
the court of appeals. Her review concluded that you ruled in favor of a
business each time. Consequently, she made this prediction: you’re going to
be a fairly reliable vote against workers’ rights across the board. Would you
respond to that, please?”).
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was “wrong.” 2 As he explained, “I know that I’ve ruled against
corporations on a regular basis on the D.C. Circuit. I think I just saw
a study . . . that suggested I tended to rule against corporations more
than the average judge. . . . I like to think [my votes] depend[] upon
the particular law and the particular facts.” 3
Ten years later, one of the most significant debates about the Court
that Roberts leads is whether it is pro-business, and what it even means
to be pro-business. 4 In this Article, I argue that the answer to the first
question is yes—both the Roberts Court and John Roberts himself are
decidedly pro-business. And while that term can have many meanings,
one of the most important is quite simple: a pro-business Court makes
it more difficult for individual consumers and employees to hold
businesses accountable when they violate the law. And that is exactly
what this Court has too often done, as Justice Elena Kagan acknowledged when she was asked whether the current Court is pro-business.
As she explained it, the current Court has “made it more difficult for
injured persons to come to court and to use federal and state law to
hold business to account for injuries that they’ve done.” 5
Since 2010, my organization, the Constitutional Accountability
Center, has been studying, as a proxy for the success of business interests before the Roberts Court, the Chamber of Commerce’s success in
merits cases in which it participates as either a party or an amicus. The
results of that analysis are straightforward: the Chamber of Commerce
has been remarkably successful. Indeed, it appears to have been more
successful before the Roberts Court than it was before either of the two

2.

Id.

3.

Id. at 427–28.

4.

Compare Adam Liptak, Corporations Find a Friend in the Supreme Court,
N.Y. Times (May 4, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/05/business/
pro-business-decisions-are-defining-this-supreme-court.html [https://perma
.cc/S4CG-YY46] (noting that the Roberts Court’s general track record has
been decidedly pro-business), and Breaking: The Roberts Court Is Extremely
Pro-Business, The Am. Prospect (Apr. 27, 2011), http://prospect.org/
article/breaking-roberts-court-extremely-pro-business [https://perma.cc/
E5N9-V427] (pointing out that conservatives on the Roberts Court prefer
policies favoring business interests), with Jonathan H. Adler, Introduction:
In Search of the Probusiness Court, in Business and the Roberts Court
11–12 (Jonathan H. Adler ed., 2016) (viewing the Roberts Court’s propensity
for pro-business decisions as a product of the Court’s unwillingness to “place
its finger on the scales to assist non-business litigants,” rather than the product of an ideological agenda).

5.

Aspen Inst., Is the Roberts Court a Pro-Business Court?, YouTube (June
30, 2013), http://youtu.be/oevJTy5kmxc [https://perma.cc/TQ24-RBMJ].
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Courts that preceded it. 6 After discussing those results, I consider one
of the most significant implications of that success: the greater difficulty
individuals face in holding businesses accountable in court when they
violate the law. Finally, I conclude by providing some thoughts on what
lies ahead for the Supreme Court and the business docket in the near
term.

I. The Chamber’s Success
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce is the “world’s largest business
organization representing the interests of more than 3 million businesses
of all sizes, sectors, and regions.” 7 The litigation wing of the U.S. Chamber, the National Chamber Litigation Center, is, by its own account,
“the voice of business in the courts” and regularly files in the Supreme
Court on issues of interest to the business community, even where no
business is a party to the case. 8
Since 2010, the Constitutional Accountability Center (CAC) has
used the Chamber’s success in merits cases at the Court—as either
party or amicus—as a window into determining how business interests
have fared before the Roberts Court. 9 And at the conclusion of
Roberts’s first decade on the Court, CAC released a report designed to
answer just that question based on the data produced by looking at
every case in which the Chamber participated since Justice Samuel

6.

As discussed in greater detail below, CAC’s study did not look at the
Chamber’s success during the entire Burger and Rehnquist Courts, but instead looked at a multi-year period for each Court in which its membership
was stable. See infra Part I(A).

7.

About the U.S. Chamber, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, https://www.
uschamber.com/about-us/about-the-us-chamber [https://perma.cc/C7AR9W5T] (last visited Feb. 9, 2017).

8.

U.S. Chamber Litig. Ctr., NCLC Celebrates 30 Years of Advocacy on Behalf
of the Business Community, U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Feb. 27, 2007),
http://www.chamberlitigation.com/news/releases/nclc-celebrates-30-yearsadvocacy-behalf-business-community [https://perma.cc/PA8Y-49FE].

9.

Tom Donnelly, Constitutional Accountability Ctr., Roberts at
10: Chief Justice Roberts and Big Business 5 (2015), http://
theusconstitution.org/sites/default/files/briefs/Roberts_at_10_10_Busine
ss.pdf [https://perma.cc/AY8M-SQ63] (last visited Feb. 17, 2017). For
another study of the Chamber’s success before the Court, see David L.
Franklin, What Kind of Business-Friendly Court? Explaining the Chamber
of Commerce’s Success at the Roberts Court, 49 Santa Clara L. Rev.
1019, 1019–20 (2009) (noting that the Chamber’s success rate at the merits
stage indicates that the Roberts Court is a business-friendly Court); see also
id. at 1019 (“[I]n the less than three full Terms of the Roberts Court, the
Chamber has been not only unusually active but unusually successful at both
[the certiorari and plenary stages of review].”).
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Alito joined the Court in early 2006—a universe of 142 cases. 10 In that
same report, CAC also looked at the Chamber’s success over time, thus
providing a basis for comparing its success before the Roberts Court to
its success in prior periods. To do that, CAC examined the last five
terms of the Burger Court, from Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s joining
the Court in 1981 until Justice Antonin Scalia joined in 1986, as well
as the last eleven terms of the Rehnquist Court, from the beginning of
October 1993 until the end of the 2004 October Term in June 2005. 11
To be sure, the results of this study provide only part of the story
of business at the Roberts Court—they do not, for example, reveal
anything about the types of questions that the Court is choosing to
answer, or about the impact of the decisions the Court is reaching. Nor
do they necessarily capture every single case in which business may
have an interest. As Jonathan Adler has pointed out, the Chamber “at
times . . . stays its hand, either because its membership is divided or it
has determined limited resources are better spent in other cases—
perhaps because the likelihood of winning a given case is too remote,” 12
which means, in his view, that “focusing solely on cases in which the
Chamber participates may produce an incomplete picture.” 13 Nonetheless, the Chamber’s success provides at least some indication of how
business has fared before this Court. Indeed, unless there is some reason
to think that the Chamber is systematically more likely to participate
in cases in which it is likely to win now than it was in the past, its
success over time should provide a good indication of how the Roberts
Court compares to those that preceded it, as well as how John Roberts
compares to other Justices, past and present.
A. The Roberts Court

CAC’s review of the Chamber’s success before the Court leaves no
doubt: the Chamber is remarkably successful. As Tom Donnelly wrote
in the report examining how the Chamber has fared during the first
10.

See Donnelly, supra note 9, at 5 (describing CAC’s analysis of the
Chamber’s success before the Roberts Court). Notably this analysis does not
consider the Chamber’s success in encouraging the Court to take up certain
cases, even though there is strong evidence that amicus briefs can be particularly effective at the certiorari stage. See, e.g., Gregory A. Caldeira & John
R. Wright, Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in the U.S. Supreme
Court, 82 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1109, 1122 (1988) (“Without question, then,
interested parties can have a significant and positive impact on the Court’s
agenda by participating as amici curiae prior to the Court’s decision on
certiorari or jurisdiction.”); see also Franklin, supra note 9, at 1024–25
(discussing the Chamber’s success at the certiorari stage of litigation).

11.

Donnelly, supra note 9, at 6–7.

12.

Adler, supra note 4, at 4.

13.

Id. at 4–5.
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decade of the Roberts Court, “a cohesive five-Justice majority on the
Court . . . has produced victories for the Chamber’s position in the vast
majority of its cases.” 14 Moreover, the Chamber is more successful now
than it has been in the past. Indeed, the figures are striking. The Chamber enjoyed a sixty-nine percent success rate during the first decade of
the Roberts Court, a success rate markedly higher than it enjoyed
during the periods of the Rehnquist and Burger Courts that were also
studied. 15 Strikingly, during the five-year period of the Burger Court
that was studied, the Chamber won fifteen of thirty-five cases, for a
winning percentage of only forty-three percent. 16 While the Chamber
fared better during the Rehnquist Court, it still did not perform as well
as it is currently performing before the Roberts Court; the Chamber’s
winning percentage during the eleven terms of the Rehnquist Court was
fifty-six percent, winning forty-five of eighty cases. 17
The cause of the Chamber’s current success is also interesting: the
Chamber is not benefitting from diverse coalitions of justices supporting
it in different cases. Rather, there is (as most current Court watchers
would suspect) a cohesive five justice majority that consistently votes
for the Chamber. As Donnelly explained, “the members of the Court’s
conservative majority are tightly bunched in their overall support for
the Chamber.” 18 Indeed, even Justice Anthony Kennedy, the conservative Justice most likely to vote with the Court’s more progressive
members, voted for the Chamber seventy-two percent of the time, just
below the Justice with the greatest support for the Chamber (i.e., Justice Samuel Alito, who voted for the Chamber seventy-four percent of
the time). 19
This is not to say, of course, that the Court’s conservative and
relatively progressive Justices never see eye to eye on cases in which
the Chamber has an interest. After all, the Court’s more progressive
justices collectively “cast nearly half of their votes (47%) in favor of the
Chamber’s position.” 20 And many decisions are not divided along ideological lines, with the Court finding it relatively easy to reach a consensus on the outcome.” 21 Yet in the twenty-nine percent of cases that
sharply divided the Court (i.e., those decided 5–4 or 5–3), the

14.

Donnelly, supra note 9, at 5.

15.

Id. at 6.

16.

Id.

17.

Id. at 7.

18.

Id. at 5–6.

19.

Id. at 6.

20.

Id.

21.

Id.
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ideological divide between the Justices is evident. 22 In the forty-one
Chamber cases decided by just one or two votes, eighty percent were
Chamber victories, and in those cases, the conservatives collectively
voted for the Chamber seventy-nine percent of the time, while the
Court’s relatively progressive members only did so twenty-two percent
of the time. 23 Interestingly, the ideological division during the last five
terms of the Burger Court was not nearly as strong—then, there was
only a twelve point divide between conservatives and liberals (49% to
37%), not the twenty-four point difference in support for the Chamber’s
position that exists now. 24 Likewise, during the Rehnquist Court, the
difference in support between the Court’s conservatives and its more
liberal members was only thirteen points (61% to 48%). 25
Significantly, these conclusions are consistent with a comprehensive
study of business’s success before the Roberts Court conducted by Lee
Epstein, William Landes, and Judge Richard Posner. 26 As part of their
study, they looked at all Supreme Court cases decided between October
Term 1946 and October Term 2011 in which a business was a party on
only one side of the case. 27 Based on their examination of those cases—
1,759 in total—they concluded that the Roberts Court was “much
friendlier to business than either the Burger or Rehnquist Courts.” 28
B. John Roberts

That John Roberts is leading the most pro-business Supreme Court
in the modern era is perhaps unsurprising: according to CAC’s research
on the Chamber’s success, John Roberts himself votes for business interests far more often than he does not. 29 According to CAC’s report,
Roberts votes for the Chamber’s position in seventy percent of all cases,
making him the fourth most supportive Justice on the Court as of
2015. 30 Interestingly, his support for the Chamber climbed even
higher—to eighty-three percent—in closely divided cases (second only

22.

Id.

23.

Id.

24.

Id.

25.

Id. at 7.

26.

See Lee Epstein et al., How Business Fares in the Supreme Court, 97 Minn.
L. Rev. 1431, 1433 (2013) (analyzing the Supreme Court’s “pro- and antibusiness decisions” relative to the ideological divide and individual voting
behavior of the Justices).

27.

Id. at 1434.

28.

Id. at 1472.

29.

Donnelly, supra note 9, at 8.

30.

Id.
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to Justice Alito in his support for the Chamber). 31 This is consistent
with Epstein, Landes, and Posner’s study, which concluded that all five
of the conservatives on the Roberts Court would appear on a list of the
ten most pro-business Justices since 1946, and that Justices Alito and
Roberts would rank at the very top. 32
It is worth noting that, as those numbers reflect, Roberts does not
always vote in favor of the Chamber’s position. 33 Indeed, there are even
some Chamber cases in which Roberts has parted ways with some of
his fellow conservatives. For example, he joined the Court’s more progressive members in rejecting the business community’s efforts to weaken the federal law prohibiting pregnancy discrimination, 34 and he also
voted with Justice Kennedy and the Court’s more progressive members
to uphold EPA regulations designed to address interstate air pollution.35
But, as the numbers also reflect, the Chief Justice votes for the Chamber’s position far more often than he does not, and he has done so on a
wide variety of issues. 36

31.

Id. The conservative Justices’ voting records were highly concentrated
overall, ranging from just 69.5% to 73.6%, but were slightly more spread
out in the closely divided cases, ranging from 70.7% to 87.5%. Id.

32.

Epstein et al., supra note 26, at 1449. Alito and Roberts ranked first and
second for all cases, and first and third for 5–4 decisions. Id.

33.

Donnelly, supra note 9, at 8.

34.

Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015).

35.

EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014). Although
the Chief Justice also famously parted ways with his fellow conservatives in
upholding the Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate, Nat’l Fed’n of
Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012), the Chamber did not file a brief
on the constitutionality of the mandate. Instead, it filed only on the separate
question whether the mandate was severable from the remainder of the law.
Brief of Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Reversal as to the Severability Issue, Nat’l Fed’n of
Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (No. 11-393).

36.

See, e.g., Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007)
(establishing what constitutes a timely filing for EEOC complaints related
to sex-based pay discrimination); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310
(2010) (holding unconstitutional a federal law that prohibited “corporations
and unions from using their general treasury funds” to engage in political
speech); Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013)
(holding that “a contractual waiver of class arbitration is enforceable under
the Federal Arbitration Act when the plaintiff's cost of individually arbitrating a federal statutory claim exceeds the potential recovery”); Michigan
v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015) (holding that the EPA must consider the
costs of compliance when deciding what to regulate under the Clean Air
Act); Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013) (holding federal
law preempted a design defect claim against a pharmaceutical company for
injuries caused by a generic drug).
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Interestingly, while Roberts may have developed a record as one of
the most pro-business Justices in recent history, he hasn’t led the charge
through written opinions. Indeed, in his first decade on the Court, he
wrote only four majority opinions in the Chamber’s cases, and most of
those were in relatively low-profile cases. 37 Indeed, in perhaps the highest profile majority opinion written by the Chief Justice in a Chamber
case, Roberts made the classic Roberts move, giving the business community some, but not all, of what it wanted. As Donnelly described it,
the “opinion is quintessential John Roberts—a model for his preferred
method of moving the law.” 38
In Halliburton Co. v. Erica B. John Fund, 39 the Court was asked
whether to overrule a 1988 decision, which made it easier for investors
who bought stock based on materially misleading information to bring
class actions. 40 Had the Court done so, it would have been “one of the
most important business-law cases of the decade.” 41 But the Court
didn’t do so: Chief Justice Roberts put together a six-Justice majority
in favor of a result that didn’t overrule Basic, but still made it easier
for businesses to challenge securities class actions at the class certification stage. 42 In other words, he moved the law in his desired direction,
while adopting a posture of restraint, especially as compared to Justices
Thomas, Scalia, and Alito, who would have overruled Basic. 43
In sum, in the first decade of his tenure as Chief Justice, Roberts—
like the Court he leads—has had a decidedly pro-business record, as
reflected in his votes in support of the Chamber of Commerce’s position
in merits cases. The consequences of this pro-business shift have been

37.

Donnelly, supra note 9, at 9. He also wrote a number of concurrences
and dissents. See id. at 9–11 (discussing those opinions).

38.

Id. at 11.

39.

134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014).

40.

The Court’s 1988 decision in Basic Inc. v. Levinson had allowed investors
to proceed as a class on the presumption that “anyone who buys or sells
the stock at the market price may be considered to have relied on those
misstatements.” Halliburton, 134 S. Ct. at 2405 (discussing Basic Inc. v.
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988)).

41.

Ronald Mann, Argument Recap: Justices Not Quite Ready to Jettison
Landmark Securities Decision, Seeking Middle Ground, SCOTUSBlog
(Mar. 7, 2014, 4:45 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/03/argumentrecap-justices-not-quite-ready-to-jettison-landmark-securities-decision-seekingmiddle-ground/ [https://perma.cc/2Q4D-FKAY].

42.

Donnelly, supra note 9, at 12.

43.

Halliburton, 134 S. Ct. at 2418 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Logic, economic
realities, and our subsequent jurisprudence have undermined the foundations
of the Basic presumption, and stare decisis cannot prop up the façade that
remains. Basic should be overruled.”).
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significant in a number of different ways, but perhaps the most significant is the extent to which it has made it more difficult for individuals
to hold businesses accountable when they violate the law, as I discuss
in the next Part.

II. The Pro-Business Court: What It Means
A. Class Actions

When the Framers drafted the Constitution, they departed from
the Articles of Confederation that then governed the fledging nation in
a number of respects. One of the most significant of these was to
establish the judiciary as an independent, co-equal branch of government. 44 In doing so, the Framers sought to ensure that federal courts
would have the power to protect individual rights secured by federal
law. 45 Well-steeped in English common law, the Framers strongly believed that for each legal right there is a legal remedy 46—and the new
federal courts were to be the forum in which injured parties could seek
redress when their legal rights were violated. 47
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which allows a representative
party to sue on behalf of a class of similarly situated claimants where
certain specified conditions are met, 48 was designed, in part, to help
ensure that the Framers’ vision for the federal courts was realized. By
ensuring that injured parties can seek redress in the federal courts even
when their individual claims are too small to make individual litigation
economically feasible, the Rule helps ensure that the federal courts
really are a forum in which all legal wrongs can be remedied. 49
44.

David H. Gans, Constitutional Accountability Ctr., The
Keystone of the Arch: The Text and History of Article III and
the Constitution’s Promise of Access to Courts 5 (2016), http://
theusconstitution.org/sites/default/files/Keystone_of_the_Arch.pdf [https:
//perma.cc/F4PV-5G6K].

45.

Id. at 7.

46.

Id. at 13–14; see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803)
(“[I]t is a general and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right,
there is also a legal remedy by suit or action at law, whenever that right is
invaded.”) (quoting 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries *23).

47.

Gans, supra note 44, at 14.

48.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (requiring numerosity, commonality, typicality, and
adequate representation as threshold prerequisites for any class).

49.

See, e.g., John K. Rabiej, The Making of Class Action Rule 23—What Were
We Thinking?, 24 Miss. C. L. Rev. 323, 336–37 (2005) (explaining that the
rule was amended in 1966 to “create a procedural vehicle capable of . . .
‘enabling small people with small claims to vindicate their rights when they
could not otherwise do so’”) (quoting Memorandum from the Advisory
Comm. on Civil Rules to the Chairman and Members of the Standing
Comm. on Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the U.S.,
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Despite the important role served by the Rule 23 class action, the
Roberts Court has, on the whole, made it more difficult to bring class
actions. Perhaps the most significant example of the Roberts Court’s
antipathy to the class action device is Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Duke, 50
in which the Court held, 5–4, that female employees who alleged they
had been the victims of sex discrimination could not bring a class
action. 51 According to the Court, the plaintiffs did not satisfy the “commonality” requirement of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that is,
the requirement that there be “questions of law or fact common to the
class.” 52 As the Court explained:
[T]he only corporate policy that the plaintiffs’ evidence convincingly establishes is [the employer’s] “policy” of allowing
discretion by local supervisors over employment matters. On its
face, of course, that is just the opposite of a uniform employment
practice that would provide the commonality needed for a class
action; it is a policy against having uniform employment
practices. 53

In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg disagreed sharply with the Court’s
majority, noting that the Court gave “no credence to the key dispute
common to the class: whether Wal-Mart’s discretionary pay and promotion policies are discriminatory.” 54 She also discussed workplace
realities that the Court’s majority ignored, arguing that the Court’s
decision would prevent women from redressing “[t]he practice of delegating to supervisors large discretion [that] . . . has long been known to
have the potential to produce disparate effects,” and that the “risk of
discrimination is heightened when those managers are predominantly
of one sex, and are steeped in a corporate culture that perpetuates
gender stereotypes.” 55
Two years later, the Court issued another class action decision that
made it more difficult for individuals to bring class actions. In Comcast
Summary Statement of the Civil Rules Amendments Recommended for
Adoption 7 (June 10, 1965), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/
fr_import/CV06-1965.pdf [https://perma.cc/6TTG-M72S]).
50.

564 U.S. 338 (2011).

51.

Id.

52.

Id. at 349 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2)). The Court also held that
another aspect of plaintiffs’ claims was improperly certified under a different
provision of Rule 23, id. at 360, but the dissenters agreed with the majority on
that point. Id. at 367–68 (Ginsberg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).

53.

Id. at 355.

54.

Id. at 374 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

55.

Id. at 372–73 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Corp. v. Behrend, 56 the Court held, again 5–4, that current and former
Comcast subscribers could not seek damages from Comcast for alleged
violations of the federal antitrust laws because they had not shown that
damages could be measured on a classwide basis. 57 The dissenters on
the Court not only disagreed with the Court on the merits, 58 but again
faulted the majority for having decided the case at all. 59
To be sure, there have been a couple of class action decisions that
did not go business’s way. In Campbell-Ewald v. Gomez, 60 the Court
held, 6–3, that a defendant cannot moot a plaintiff’s case by making an
offer of judgment that the plaintiff does not accept. 61 That same term,
in Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 62 the Court held, 6–2, that plaintiffs can use “a representative sample to fill an evidentiary gap created
by the employer’s failure to keep adequate records.” 63 While both cases
were losses for the business community, they reflect as much as anything else overreach by the business community. In Tyson Foods, for
example, the Court needed only to rely on a long-standing precedent to
reach its decision. 64
In sum, while not every decision by the Roberts Court has been
pro-business, there have been enough significant decisions that have
been that it is now more difficult to bring a class action than it used to
56.

133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013).

57.

Id.

58.

Id. at 1437 (Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (“Incautiously entering the
fray at this interlocutory stage, the Court sets forth a profoundly mistaken
view of antitrust law. And in doing so, it relies on its own version of the
facts, a version inconsistent with factual findings made by the District Court
and affirmed by the Court of Appeals.”).

59.

Id. at 1435 (Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (“This case comes to the
Court infected by our misguided reformulation of the question presented.
For that reason alone, we would dismiss the writ of certiorari as
improvidently granted.”); id. at 1437 (Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting)
(“The oddity of this case, in which the need to prove damages on a classwide
basis through a common methodology was never challenged by respondents,
is a further reason to dismiss the writ as improvidently granted.” (citation
omitted)).

60.

136 S. Ct. 663 (2016).

61.

The Court made explicit, however, that it “need not . . . decide whether
the result would be different if a defendant deposits the full amount of the
plaintiff’s individual claim in an account payable to the plaintiff, and the
court then enters judgment for the plaintiff in that amount.” Id. at 672.

62.

136 S. Ct. 1036 (2016).

63.

Id. at 1047.

64.

Id. at 1047 (“This Court’s decision in Anderson v. Mt. Clemens[, 328 U.S.
680 (1946),] explains why [the expert’s] sample was permissible in the
circumstances of this case.”).
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be. 65 And that, in turn, makes it more difficult for individuals to have
their day in court and hold businesses accountable when they violate
the law.
B. Arbitration

The Constitution guarantees a right to jury trial, 66 but increasingly
in recent years, individuals who have tried to sue to redress injuries
they have suffered have found themselves barred from going to court
and forced to arbitrate instead. The Federal Arbitration Act, which
provides that written arbitration agreements “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract,” 67 was passed in 1925 in response to Supreme Court “hostility” toward private arbitration agreements; 68 nearly a century later, a Court favorably disposed toward such
agreements has used the FAA to expand arbitration and limit access to
the courts. Although this trend began in the 1980s, 69 it is one that has
continued consistently during the Roberts Court.
Two of the Court’s significant arbitration decisions came in 2010.
In Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animalfeeds International Corp., 70 the Court
held, 5–3, that “a party may not be compelled under the FAA to submit
to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding
that the party agreed to do so.” 71 In other words, the Court made it
more difficult for individuals to bring class claims in an arbitral forum.
According to Justice Ginsburg, the Court’s decision was wrong,
“allowing [the defendant] essentially to repudiate its submission of the
contract-construction issue to the arbitration panel, and to gain, in
65.

See, e.g., Georgene Vairo, Symposium, Is the Class Action Really Dead? Is
That Good or Bad for Class Members?, 64 Emory L.J. 477, 479 (2014) (“It
is no secret that the United States Supreme Court has made obtaining class
certification and group dispute resolution more difficult.”); Brandon L.
Garrett, Aggregation and Constitutional Rights, 88 Notre Dame L. Rev.
593, 594 (2012) (“One reason is that class actions seeking group-based civil
rights remedies may be difficult to bring. This is no surprise to observers of
the Supreme Court’s recent class action decisions . . . .”).

66.

U.S. Const. amend. VII (“In Suits at common law, where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved . . . .”).

67.

9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).

68.

J. Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive Law,
124 Yale L.J. 3052, 3059–60 (2015) (citations omitted).

69.

See id. at 3061 (“[T]he Supreme Court abandoned its prior skepticism regarding arbitration of federal claims and held that arbitration agreements
could be enforced with respect to a broad range of federal statutes . . . .”).

70.

559 U.S. 662 (2010).

71.

Id. at 684.
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place of the arbitrators’ judgment, [the Supreme Court’s] de novo determination.” 72 She also recognized the real-world consequences the decision would have. As Justice Ginsburg explained: “When adjudication is
costly and individual claims are no more than modest in size, class
proceedings may be ‘the thing,’ i.e., without them, potential claimants
will have little, if any, incentive to seek vindication of their rights.” 73
In Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 74 the Court held, 5-4, that
a litigant who challenges the validity of an arbitration agreement cannot bring that challenge in court unless he has objected to the specific
line in the arbitration agreement that purports to assign such challenges
to the arbitrator. 75 In other words, even if an individual believes an
arbitration agreement is invalid under state law, he must arbitrate that
challenge. Thus, the result of the Court’s decision was to make it more
difficult for individuals to bring all kinds of claims in court where they
have signed an arbitration agreement, even if that agreement is invalid.
What made the Court’s decision all the more stunning was that, as
Justice Stevens pointed out in dissent, neither party “urged [the Court]
to adopt the rule the Court does today.” 76
The next year the Court doubled down on its opposition to class
claims in arbitral forums, holding, again 5–4, that a state could not
“condition[] the enforceability of certain arbitration agreements on the
availability of classwide arbitration procedures.” 77 Thus, California’s
rule requiring that classwide arbitration procedures be available was
preempted by the FAA. 78 As Justice Breyer explained in dissent, class
arbitration was not only “consistent with the use of arbitration,” it was
also a “form of arbitration that is well known in California and followed
elsewhere.” 79 He also made the same point about the importance of class
proceedings that Justice Ginsburg did: “agreements that forbid the
consolidation of claims can lead small-dollar claimants to abandon their
claims rather than to litigate.” 80
Finally, in 2013, the Court again made clear that, in its view, there
was no exception to its staunch opposition to class claims in arbitral
72.

Id. at 693 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

73.

Id. at 699 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(“[D]isallowance of class proceedings severely shrinks the dimensions of the
case or controversy a claimant can mount . . . .”).

74.

561 U.S. 63 (2010).

75.

Id.

76.

Id. at 76 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

77.

AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 336 (2011).

78.

Id. at 352.

79.

Id. at 361 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

80.

Id. at 365 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

733

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 67·Issue 3·2017
The First Decade of the Roberts Court

forums. In American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 81 the
Court held, yet again 5–3, that a contractual waiver of class arbitration
was enforceable even if the plaintiff’s cost of individually arbitrating his
claim was greater than the maximum amount he could hope to recover. 82 According to the majority, “the fact that it is not worth the expense involved in proving a statutory remedy does not constitute the
elimination of the right to pursue that remedy.” 83
As Justice Kagan explained in dissent, “if the [contract’s] arbitration clause is enforceable, Amex has insulated itself from antitrust
liability—even if it has in fact violated the law.” 84 She then gave the
Court’s majority credit for not hiding its attitude about that result:
“here is the nutshell version of today’s opinion, admirably flaunted rather than camouflaged: Too darn bad.” 85 She went on: “[t]o a hammer,
everything looks like a nail. And to a Court bent on diminishing the
usefulness of Rule 23, everything looks like a class action, ready to be
dismantled.” 86
In short, during the first decade of the Roberts Court, the Court—
with Chief Justice Roberts on board every step of the way—has
consistently made it more likely that individuals will have to arbitrate
rather than have their day in court, and it has limited the ability of
injured parties forced into arbitral parties to vindicate their rights
there.
What does this trend mean? While a full discussion of the consequences of this shift is beyond the scope of this Article, there is a rich
literature that describes the numerous ways in which this shift has
harmed injured individuals, as well as the legal system. David Schwartz,
for example, has written that “displacing adjudication through predispute arbitration clauses systematically reduces the legal liability of
corporate defendants.” 87 And Maria Glover has explained that by
“handing this quasi-lawmaking power to private parties and by reducing substantive statutory rights to mere formalities—to little more than
empty rights—the Court has eroded the substantive law itself.” 88

81.

133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).

82.

Id.

83.

Id. at 2311.

84.

Id. at 2313 (Kagan, J., dissenting).

85.

Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting).

86.

Id. at 2320 (Kagan, J., dissenting).

87.

David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee
and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wis.
L. Rev. 33, 37 (1997).

88.

Glover, supra note 68, at 3059.
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C. Preemption

Another area in which the Roberts Court, while not always probusiness, has markedly shifted the law in a pro-business direction is
preemption. The Supremacy Clause provides that “[t]his Constitution,
and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land.” 89 It is wellestablished that where state law conflicts with federal law, that state
law is preempted by the federal law. 90 There has been considerable
controversy, however, over when and how courts should determine
whether a state law is preempted by federal law.
One of the biggest Chamber losses before the Roberts Court was in
Wyeth v. Levine, 91 a case about a plaintiff’s state-law claim that the
warning label of a drug she had received was insufficient. 92 The Court,
6–3, held that the plaintiff’s state law claim was not preempted.93
According to the Court’s majority (Justice Kennedy joined the Court’s
more progressive members, and Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment), the “manufacturer bears responsibility for the content of its label
at all times” because nothing in federal law prohibited manufacturers
from strengthening their warning labels even before receiving FDA
approval. 94 In reaching this result, the majority applied a presumption
against preemption, 95 and also rejected the notion that state consumer
laws posed an obstacle to the federal regulatory scheme. 96 As the Court
explained, “the FDA long maintained that state law offers an
additional, and important, layer of consumer protection that complements FDA regulation.” 97 To the dissenters, the Court’s view impermissibly sent mixed messages to businesses like Wyeth: “The FDA told
Wyeth that [the manufacturer] label renders its use ‘safe.’ But the State
of Vermont, through its tort law, said: ‘Not so.’” 98

89.

U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.

90.

See, e.g., PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 617 (2011) (“Where state
and federal law ‘directly conflict,’ state law must give way.” (citation
omitted)).

91.

555 U.S. 555 (2009).

92.

Id.

93.

Id. at 581.

94.

Id. at 570–71.

95.

Id. at 565 n.3.

96.

Id. at 573.

97.

Id. at 579.

98.

Id. at 628 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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Two years later, the Court took a different path on preemption. In
PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 99 the Court, this time 5–4, held that the injured plaintiffs’ failure-to-warn claims were preempted by federal drug
laws. 100 According to the Court’s majority, even though Wyeth held
that federal drug laws did not preempt state consumer safety laws when
it came to brand-name drugs, the same did not hold true with respect
to generic drugs; rather, with respect to generics, so long as the manufacturer complied with federal law, an injured party could not sue under
state tort law. 101 In the Court’s view, federal law limits a generic drug
manufacturer’s authority to unilaterally change its label to address
newly discovered risks. 102
But as the dissenters pointed out, even though generic drug manufacturers cannot unilaterally change their labels, they can—and must—
approach the FDA to seek to revise a drug’s label when they have reasonable evidence of a serious problem with the drug. 103 Thus, “federal
law affords generic manufacturers a mechanism for attempting to
comply with their state-law duties to warn, . . . [and] does not categorically pre-empt state-law failure-to-warn claims against generic manufacturers.” 104 In dissent, Justice Sotomayor also noted the “absurd consequences” of the Court’s ruling—namely, that a consumer’s rights to
sue a drug manufacturer under state law over an inadequately labeled
drug would turn on whether the pharmacist filled it with a brand name
or a generic. 105
Two years later, the Court’s conservative majority again made it
more difficult for individuals to bring state law claims for injuries
caused by a generic drug. In that case, the plaintiff suffered rare (but
known) side-effects of a generic drug she was taking for shoulder pain:
the drug “caused two-thirds of her skin to slough off, damag[ing] her
lungs and esophagus and render[ing] her legally blind.” 106 She was

99.

564 U.S. 604 (2011).

100. Notably, the Chamber did not participate in this case. Summary of PLIVA,
Inc. v. Mensing, SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/
cases/pliva-inc-v-mensing/ [https://perma.cc/YVH4-SN4R] (last visited Feb.
18, 2017).
101. See PLIVA, 564 U.S. at 626 (“It is beyond dispute that the federal statutes
and regulations that apply to brand-name drug manufacturers are meaningfully different than those that apply to generic drug manufacturers.”).
102. Id. at 613–15.
103. Id. at 631–32 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 645 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 643 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
106. Adam Liptak, Justices Explore Fine Line on Generic Drug Injuries, N.Y.
Times (Mar. 19, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/20/business/
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awarded a $21 million verdict by a New Hampshire jury. 107 According
to the Court’s majority, PLIVA controlled, and the plaintiff’s claim was
preempted. 108 In dissent, Justice Sotomayor explained why the Court’s
decision was at odds with precedent and noted that “the Court has left
a seriously injured consumer without any remedy despite Congress’ explicit efforts to preserve state common-law liability.” 109
Thus, as others have noted, “by siding with the business community, Chief Justice Roberts and his conservative colleagues closed
the courthouse doors to certain patients who have been severely injured
by generic drugs.” 110 And several members of the Court, including the
Chief Justice, would have “gone even further, eliminating these statelaw claims even in the case of brand-name drugs.” 111

III. Looking Ahead
Ever since the 2016 election results came in, there has been a lot of
talk about what those results will mean for the Supreme Court. In the
short term, the answer seems clear: a return to the Court that existed
before Justice Antonin Scalia passed away, namely, one that is very
conservative, but in which some progressive victories are possible.112
What that means with respect to the Court’s business docket, in
particular, is that despite Donald Trump’s populist campaign rhetoric, 113 the Supreme Court will likely remain decidedly probusiness 114—to the detriment of consumers and employees who are
seeking to ensure that businesses comply with the law.
justices-explore-fine-line-on-generic-drug-injuries.html [https://perma.cc/
9BEX-J4EW].
107. Id.
108. Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2470 (2013).
109. Id. at 2496 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer wrote a separate
dissent, explaining why he could not “give special weight to the FDA’s
views.” Id. at 2481 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
110. Donnelly, supra note 9, at 17–18.
111. Id. at 18.
112. See Jonathan H. Adler, Business and the Roberts Court Without Scalia,
Wash. Post (Sept. 21, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/09/21/business-and-the-roberts-court-withoutscalia/ [https://perma.cc/WMV7-8BA8] (describing the Supreme Court’s
future concerning business decisions without Justice Scalia on the bench).
113. See, e.g., Geoff Dyer et al., Trump and Clinton Focus Frantic Final Push on
Battleground States, Fin. Times (Nov. 6, 2016), http://www.ft.com/
content/1d69272a-a446-11e6-8898-79a99e2a4de6 [https://perma.cc/R5CNUGBD] (discussing Trump’s campaign rhetoric).
114. Cf. Judith E. Schaeffer, Constitutional Accountability Ctr.,
Supreme Court Nominee Neil Gorsuch: Expected by Big Business
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Notably, the Supreme Court has not had to wait long before returning to issues like class actions and arbitration. Currently on the
Court’s merits docket, for example, is Microsoft Corp. v. Baker. 115 Although the Court granted cert in the case in January 2016, 116 the Court
did not hold oral argument until March 2017. The question in the case
is “whether a federal court of appeals has jurisdiction to review an order
denying class certification after the named plaintiffs voluntarily dismiss
their claims with prejudice.” 117 Although the Court had not yet issued
an opinion in this case as of the time this Article went to print, postargument commentary suggests that this case is likely to represent a
win for business. 118
To be sure, this case will not decide issues at the heart of the Rule
23 class action, but it is nonetheless important; the Chamber of
Commerce urged the Court to hear the case, explaining that “the Ninth
Circuit has allowed class-action plaintiffs to take immediate appeals of
orders denying class certification even in cases where the requirements
for interlocutory appeals . . . have not been met. The Chamber and its
members have an interest in seeing this practice end.” 119 But as others
have argued in merits briefs before the Court, the Supreme Court’s own
precedents “ensure that, when a district court erroneously denies class
certification, the court of appeals is able to review and reverse that
denial, regardless of whether the passage of time, acts of defendants, or
impracticalities of litigating small claims lead to the final termination
of the named plaintiffs’ individual claims.” 120
to be Another Reliable Vote on the Roberts Court 1 (2017),
http://theusconstitution.org/sites/default/files/CAC-Gorsuch-And-Business
.pdf [https://perma.cc/XNG9-LN8G] (explaining that “[a]dvocates for
business interests . . . proclaim[ed] the Gorsuch nomination a big win for
corporate America”).
115. Summary of Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, SCOTUSblog, http://www.
scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/microsoft-corp-v-baker/ [https://perma.cc/
37RK-DA3N] (last visited Feb. 19, 2017).
116. Id.
117. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, 136 S. Ct. 890
(2015) (No. 15-457).
118. Ronald Mann, Argument Analysis: Justices Dubious about Free Review of
Decisions Denying Class Certification, SCOTUSblog (Mar. 21, 2017), http:
//www.scotusblog.com/2017/03/argument-analysis-justices-dubious-freereview-decisions-denying-class-certification/ [https://perma.cc/D2RD-CZ7J].
119. Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 2, Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, 136
S. Ct. 890 (No. 15-457) (Nov. 12, 2015).
120. Brief of Public Citizen, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at
3, Microsoft v. Baker, 136 S. Ct. 890 (2016) (No. 15-457). See also id. (“The
Court’s precedents help make certain that a district court’s erroneous denial
of class certification does not irrevocably deprive the courts of the efficiency
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The Supreme Court also recently decided to hear three cases, all of
which raise the question whether an employer can force an employee to
resolve employment-related disputes through individual arbitration and
waive class proceedings. As two courts of appeals have concluded, such
agreements violate the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 121 which
provides that “[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to
form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection,” 122 and then makes it an “unfair labor practice for an
employer . . . to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of the” aforementioned rights. 123 According to these courts, the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) does not preempt the NLRA because of
the FAA’s savings clause, which, as the Supreme Court has recognized,
“permits agreements to arbitrate to be invalidated by ‘generally applicable contract defenses.’” 124 As these courts explain, illegality is such a
defense. 125 One court of appeals came out the other way, relying on a
prior opinion of that court which held that the “‘use of class action
procedures . . . is not a substantive right’” under the NLRA. 126 It is too
early to know what the Supreme Court will do, but if it holds that these
agreements are valid, it will make it that much more difficult for
employees to hold their employers accountable if they try to violate the
law.
Finally, there will no doubt be other significant issues affecting
business on the Court’s docket in the near term. One of the biggest may
be the continuing validity and scope of doctrines of administrative
and economy of scale served by the class-action device or keep plaintiffs with
meritorious claims from being able to join together to vindicate their rights.”).
121. Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that
an employer who requires its employees to sign an agreement that precludes
them from bringing a legal claim in any forum regarding working conditions
violates the National Labor Relations Act); Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823
F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that requiring employees to bring wageand-hour claims through individual arbitration violated the National Labor
Relations Act and the Federal Arbitration Act).
122. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
123. Id. § 158(a)(1).
124. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011) (quoting
Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996)).
125. Morris, 834 F.3d at 988 (“[B]ecause a substantive federal right is waived by
the contract . . . it is accurate to characterize its terms as ‘illegal.’”); Lewis,
823 F.3d at 1159 (“Illegality is a standard contract defense contemplated by
the FAA’s saving clause.”).
126. Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB, 808 F.3d 1013, 1016 (5th Cir. 2015)
(quoting D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 357 (5th Cir. 2013)).
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deference, which provide that where statutes are ambiguous, courts
should defer to reasonable interpretations of the agencies charged with
interpreting them. 127 A related doctrine provides that courts should also
defer to agencies’ reasonable construction of their own regulations. 128
Conservatives have long questioned these doctrines. Chief Justice
John Roberts has been at the forefront of these efforts, making clear his
disdain for the administrative state and Chevron. For example, dissenting in a case in which the majority applied Chevron deference, the
Chief Justice wrote that “[t]he Framers could hardly have envisioned
today’s ‘vast and varied federal bureaucracy’ and the authority administrative agencies now hold over our economic, social, and political
activities. . . . ‘[T]he administrative state with its reams of regulations
would leave them rubbing their eyes.’” 129 In that opinion, Roberts made
clear his distaste for Chevron deference, noting that “Chevron is a
powerful weapon in an agency’s regulatory arsenal” because it means
agency interpretations often have “the full force and effect of law.”130
He went on: “It would be a bit much to describe the result as ‘the very
definition of tyranny,’ but the danger posed by the growing power of
the administrative state cannot be dismissed.” 131 To the Chief Justice
(and Justices Kennedy and Alito who joined his dissent), it was inappropriate to accord the agency interpretation at issue in that case
Chevron deference. According to Justice Scalia, who wrote for the
Court, the Chief Justice’s approach would have resulted in a “massive
revision of [the Court’s] Chevron jurisprudence.” 132
More recently, in King v. Burwell, 133 Chief Justice Roberts similarly
took aim at Chevron. In that case, Roberts acknowledged that courts

127. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984).
128. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461–63 (1997).
129. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1878 (2013) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight
Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 499 (2010) and Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 807 (1999)
(Souter, J., dissenting)); see also id. at 1879 (noting the “hundreds of federal
agencies poking into every nook and cranny of daily life”).
130. Id. at 1879.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1874. Justice Thomas has also questioned Chevron deference. See, e.g.,
Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(stating that the EPA’s “request for deference raises serious questions about
the constitutionality of our broader practice of deferring to agency interpretations of federal statutes”).
133. 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
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will normally apply Chevron when considering an agency’s interpretation of a statute. 134 But, Roberts cautioned, “‘[i]n extraordinary cases
. . . there may be reason to hesitate before [applying Chevron].’”135
According to the Court, King was “one of those cases” because the
question at issue was one “of deep ‘economic and political significance’
that is central to [the] statutory scheme; had Congress wished to assign
that question to an agency, it surely would have done so expressly.”136
This view, if applied in the future, could create a major hole in the longstanding doctrine of Chevron deference. 137 It’s not difficult to imagine
the Court soon taking up cases that could give it the opportunity to
further define these doctrines, which in turn will affect how readily
agencies can regulate business. 138

Conclusion
Over ten years ago, there was debate about whether John Roberts
would be a pro-business Justice. While that debate will no doubt continue, one thing is clear: it’s been a good decade for business at the
Roberts Court. And, unfortunately, a good decade for business has
meant a bad decade for consumers and employees who want to be able
to hold businesses accountable in court when they violate the law.
While no one can say for certain what the next decade will hold, it’s
likely to be more of the same, at least in the near term.

134. Id. at 2488 (“When analyzing an agency’s interpretation of a statute, we
often apply the two-step framework announced in Chevron . . . .”).
135. Id. at 2488 (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S.
120, 159 (2000)).
136. Id. at 2489 (quoting Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427,
2444 (2014)).
137. Conservative Justices on the Court had begun questioning Auer deference,
as well. See, e.g., Adam White, Scalia and Chevron: Not Drawing Lines, but
Resolving Tensions, Yale J. Reg.: Notice & Comment (Feb. 23, 2016),
http://yalejreg.com/nc/scalia-and-chevron-not-drawing-lines-butresolving-tensions-by-adam-j-white/ [https://perma.cc/JK2B-3UYA] (noting
that “recent years had seen Justice Scalia expressing serious doubts about
[Auer deference]”).
138. Significantly, the Court’s newest member, Justice Neil Gorsuch, criticized
Chevron while he was serving on the court of appeals, “suggest[ing] that [it
is] contrary to the Constitution’s principle of separation of powers.”
Schaeffer, supra note 114, at 5; see also David H. Gans, Constitutional Accountability Ctr., The Selective Originalism of Judge
Neil Gorsuch: A Review of the Record 16 (2017), http://theus
constitution.org/sites/default/files/briefs/CAC-Selective-Originalism-ofGorsuch.pdf [https://perma.cc/GH2V-R9C5] (explaining that “Gorsuch’s
claim that [Chevron] rests on an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
and judicial power to agencies is wrong”).
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